In the US, defense R&D share of GDP has decreased significantly since 1960. To analyze the implications on growth and welfare, we develop an R&D-based growth model that features the crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D. The model also captures the effects of defense technology on (i) national security resembling consumption-type public goods and (ii) aggregate productivity via the spin-off effect resembling productive public goods. In this framework, economic growth is driven by market-based civilian R&D as in standard R&D-based growth models and government-financed public goods (i.e., defense R&D) as in Barro (1990) . We find that defense R&D has an inverted-U effect on growth, and the growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in the spillover and spin-off effects. As for the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security-enhancing effect of defense technology, and there exists a critical degree of this security-enhancing effect below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the growth-maximizing level.
Introduction
In the US, defense R&D as a percentage of GDP decreased from 1.29% in 1961 to 0.57% in 2008 (see Figure 1 ). This phenomenon has led to a number of studies on the effects of defense R&D on economic growth. For example, a recent empirical study by Goel et al. (2008) finds that defense R&D has a positive and significant effect on growth in the US. While it is interesting to analyze the growth effects of defense R&D, it is also important to consider its welfare effects given that growth maximization may not be equivalent to welfare maximization. To shed some light on this issue, we develop an R&D-based growth model to explore the different channels through which defense R&D affects growth and welfare.
Specifically, we develop an R&D-based growth model that captures the commonly discussed crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D. 1 The crowdingout effect refers to the case in which an increase in defense R&D reduces the factor inputs available for civilian R&D and hence has a negative effect on the growth of civilian technology.
For example, Hartley (2006) notes that " [d] efence R&D has obvious opportunity costs through the use of scarce scientific personnel and assets that could be used on civilian research." Also, Gullec and van Pottelsberghe (2003) analyze a group of OECD countries and find that defense R&D indeed has a crowding-out effect on civilian R&D. The spillover effect refers to the case in which defense R&D contributes to the performance of civilian R&D and hence has a positive effect on growth. For example, Chakrabarti and Anyanwu (1993) find that defense R&D has an indirect positive effect on the growth rate of civilian output in the US through technological change for which the number of patents serves as a proxy, and they discuss how this empirical finding supports the presence of a spillover effect from defense R&D to the civilian economy.
In addition to the crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D, our model also features two important effects of defense technology (which is accumulated by investment in defense R&D). Firstly, higher defense technology improves national security and increases the utility of households resembling consumption-type public goods. For example, Hartley (2006) argues that " [d] efense R&D increases a nation's military capability so improving its national security through using technology (quality) rather than increasing the quantity of arms."
Secondly, defense technology improves aggregate productivity, resembling growth-enhancing public goods, through the development of general-purpose technologies (GPTs) that have civil applications. This effect is referred to as the spin-off effect in the defense literature. For example, Ruttan (2006) argues that research in defense has played an important role in the development of some major GPTs, such as (i) interchangeable parts and mass production, (ii) military and commercial aircraft, (iii) nuclear energy and electric power, (iv) computers and semiconductors, and (v) the internet.
In our theoretical framework, economic growth is driven by market-based civilian R&D as in standard R&D-based growth models and government-financed public goods (i.e., defense R&D) as in Barro (1990) . We find that a reduction in defense R&D leads to contrasting effects on the growth of output and consumption. In particular, starting at a high (low) level of defense R&D, reducing defense R&D has a positive (negative) effect on growth. Therefore, there exists a growth-maximizing level of defense R&D that is increasing in the spillover and spin-off effects.
As for the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security-enhancing effect of defense technology, and there is a critical degree of this security-enhancing effect below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the growth-maximizing level.
This study contributes to the literature on defense and economic growth by providing a tractable growth-theoretic framework that formalizes the commonly discussed crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D. To our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to model defense R&D within an R&D-based growth model. Previous studies analyze the dynamic effects of defense spending either in an endowment economy or in a capital-accumulation-driven growth model. 2 For example, Shieh et al. (2002) perform a similar growth-welfare analysis on defense spending in an AK growth model and find that the welfare-maximizing level of defense spending is always above the growth-maximizing level. We derive a similar result under a special case of our growth model in which the production sector only employs unskilled labor. However, when the production sector also uses skilled labor, there is an additional crowding-out effect of defense R&D on the production of final goods. Consequently, whether the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is above or below the growth-maximizing level depends on the relative magnitude of this crowding-out effect versus the security-enhancing effect of defense technology.
Our study also relates to the literature on productive government spending and economic growth initiated by Barro (1990) . While Barro (1990) models public inputs as a flow variable, our study follows the formulation in Futagami et al. (1993) to model public inputs as a stock variable. 3 The resulting spin-off effect of defense technology leads to an extra channel of growth via productive public goods in addition to market-based civilian R&D. Furthermore, we consider the security-enhancing effect of defense technology resembling consumption-type public goods as in Turnovsky (1996) and Shieh et al. (2002) , among others.
The theoretical implications of our study rationalize the results of previous empirical studies that find ambiguous growth effects of defense spending/R&D. In an early study, Benoit (1973) finds that defense spending has a positive effect on growth in developing countries.
However, upon surveying the follow-up studies, Ram (1995) concludes that defense spending has opposing effects on growth and the overall effect is ambiguous. 4 Similarly, Lichtenberg (1995) finds that defense R&D has opposing effects on growth and the net effect is ambiguous.
In contrast, Goel et al. (2008) finds that defense R&D has a positive and significant effect on growth in the US, and surprisingly, this effect is even stronger than private industrial R&D.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and analyzes the balanced-growth path. Section 4 examines the growth and welfare effects of defense R&D. The final section concludes with policy implications.
A quality-ladder growth model with defense R&D
We incorporate defense R&D into a modified version of the Grossman-Helpman (1991) qualityladder model, which is a workhorse model in the R&D-based growth literature. There are four effects of defense R&D in the model. Firstly, it has a positive spillover effect on civilian R&D.
Secondly, it has a crowding-out effect on factor inputs for civilian R&D and production. Thirdly, defense technology improves national security and has a positive effect on households' welfare.
Finally, defense technology improves aggregate productivity through the spin-off effect. It is worth noting that defense R&D is a flow variable while defense technology is a stock variable.
Although the quality-ladder model features only labor inputs, it is appropriate for our analysis because R&D scientists and engineers are the crucial inputs for innovation in civilian and defense technologies. Given that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, the familiar components of the model will be briefly described to conserve space while the new features will be described in more details below.
Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a standard log utility function.
(1) h , (to be discussed in more details later). As mentioned above, we follow previous studies to assume that households derive utility from national security for which the level of defense technology t d serves as a proxy. 5 In other words, defense technology resembles consumptiontype public goods, and the parameter 0 ≥ δ determines the degree of this security-enhancing effect of defense technology.
Households maximize utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
v is the value of assets owned by households, and t r is the real rate of return. Each household is endowed with one unit of high-skill labor (for production, civilian R&D, and defense R&D) and l units of low-skill labor for production only. The market wage rates for high-skill and low-skill labors are t h w , and t l w , respectively. The government levies a lump-sum tax t τ to finance defense R&D.
6 From utility maximization, the familiar Euler equation is
Final goods
Final goods t y are produced by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a unit continuum of differentiated intermediates goods
This sector is perfectly competitive, and the producers take the output price and the input prices
as given. From profit maximization, the conditional demand function for
Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries
producing the differentiated intermediate goods.
In each industry i, there is a temporary monopolistic leader, who holds a patent on the latest innovation and dominates the market until the next innovation occurs. The production function for the leader in industry i is
are respectively high-skill and low-skill production labors in industry i.
The parameter ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ θ determines the intensity of high-skill labor in production, and we will show that θ captures the crowding-out effect of defense R&D on consumption. As discussed in Ruttan (2006) From cost minimization, the marginal cost of production for the leader in industry i is
As is standard in the literature, the current and former leaders engage in Bertrand competition, 7 and the profit-maximizing price for the current leader is a constant markup (given by the quality step size z ) over the marginal cost (i.e., ) ( ) (
). 8 As a result, the amount of flow profit
where the second equality makes use of the conditional demand function
Civilian R&D
Denote the value of an invention in industry i as ) ( i v t . From (6), the amount of profit is the same across industries. As a result, The left-hand side of (7) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (7) ϕ is the productivity of civilian R&D.
Free entry leads to zero expected profit in the R&D sector such that 10 For analytical tractability, we consider the following functional form
This functional form is tractable because the spillover effects of defense R&D is captured by a
. When φ equals zero, the R&D sector reduces to the setup in the Grossman-Helpman model in which the productivity of civilian R&D is determined by ϕ .
Defense R&D
Government invests in defense R&D to improve defense technology according to
denotes the growth rate of defense technology, and the function (.) f satisfies the following regularity conditions
This setup can be interpreted as the case in which defense R&D is performed by the government and (11) is the government's production function of defense technology. Alternatively, (12) can be viewed as cost-reimbursement contracts with defense firms. In this case, (.) f is also affected by the incentives of defense firms in doing efficient R&D. 11 Under either interpretation, a higher level of defense R&D increases tax burden and reduces available high-skill labor for production and civilian R&D (i.e., the crowding-out effect of defense R&D).
Decentralized equilibrium
This section firstly defines the equilibrium and then characterizes the balanced-growth path. The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations 
Balanced-growth path
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991) , the dynamics of the model is characterized by saddlepoint stability, so that the economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced-growth path.
Lemma 1: Given a constant d h , the economy is on a unique and stable balanced-growth path.
Proof: See Appendix A.□ Given that the economy is on a balanced-growth path, we next derive the stationary equilibrium allocation of civilian R&D labor for a given d h . In summary, we use the zero-profit condition from the R&D sector and the resource constraint for high-skill labor to solve for r h .
Lemma 2:
The equilibrium allocation of civilian R&D labor is stationary and given by A larger θ increases the usage of high-skill labor in production; therefore, r h is decreasing in θ .
A larger ϕ increases R&D productivity and the incentives for civilian R&D; therefore, r h is increasing in ϕ for a given d h . As for defense R&D, it has contrasting effects on civilian R&D.
On one hand, a larger d h reduces the supply of high-skill labor in the market (i.e., the crowdingout effect), and this is a negative effect on civilian R&D. On the other hand, a larger d h raises R&D productivity
=
(i.e., the spillover effect), and this is a positive effect on civilian R&D. We impose a lower bound on ϕ to ensure that r h is positive.
Condition R (R&D productivity):
Chu & Lai: Defense R&D -12 -Substituting (4) into (3) yields the aggregate production function
, where the aggregate level of civilian technology is defined as
The second equality of (14) is obtained by using the law of large numbers. From (14), the growth rate of civilian technology is
is the aggregate arrival rate of innovation. Although the innovation process of each R&D entrepreneur is stochastic, the idiosyncratic uncertainty washes out at the aggregate level, and aggregate technology increases at a constant rate along the balanced-growth path.
Growth and welfare effects of defense R&D
Before analyzing the growth and welfare effects of defense R&D, we first establish a connection between defense R&D labor d h in the model and defense R&D share of GDP that we observe in the data.
Lemma 3: Defense R&D share of GDP is monotonically increasing in d h .
Proof: See Appendix A.□ Next, we consider how d h affects growth and welfare. Let's denote the balanced-growth rate of consumption and output by
. From the aggregate production function,
-13 -In this model, economic growth is driven by z g (i.e., market-based civilian R&D as in standard R&D-based growth models) and d g (i.e., government-financed public goods as in Barro (1990) ).
Suppose we suppress the spillover effect (i.e., 0 = φ ) and the spinoff effect (i.e., 0 = α ). Then, (16) shows that d h only has a negative effect on growth through crowding out civilian R&D.
When we allow for either a positive spillover effect (i.e., 0 > φ ) or a positive spinoff effect (i.e., 0 > α ), (16) shows that d h has a countervailing positive effect on growth.
Proposition 1: There exists a growth-maximizing level of defense R&D * d h that is increasing in φ (the spillover effect of defense R&D) and α (the spin-off effect of defense technology). A decrease in defense R&D has a positive (negative) effect on growth if d h is above (below)
Proof: See Appendix A.□ Proposition 1 suggests that the reduction in defense R&D in the US should have ambiguous effects on growth. These ambiguous effects arise from the opposing forces of the crowding-out effect on civilian R&D versus the spillover and spin-off effects. Therefore, the growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in φ (the spillover effect) and α (the spin-off effect). Figure 2 plots the growth rate of consumption/output as a function of d h .
[Insert Figure 2 here]
We next evaluate the effects of defense R&D on social welfare. Imposing the balancedgrowth condition on (1) simplifies the lifetime utility of households to Combining (13) and the resource constraint for high-skill labor yields
which is decreasing in d h .
Suppose we suppress the security-enhancing effect (i.e., 0 = δ ) and the crowding-out effect on production (i.e., 0 = θ ). In this case, (18) shows that the growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is equivalent to the welfare-maximizing level. Suppose we allow 0 > θ while keeping 0 = δ . In this case, defense R&D has a crowding-out effect on initial consumption. As a result, the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is below the growth-maximizing level.
Suppose we allow 0 > δ while keeping 0 = θ . In this case, defense R&D has a positive effect on nation security. As a result, the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D is above the growthmaximizing level. This special result resembles the one in Shieh et al. (2002) . In general, when both the security-enhancing effect and the crowding-out effect on consumption are present, the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D can be above or below the growth-maximizing level.
To derive the cutoff value δ at which the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing levels of defense R&D coincide, we firstly set (18) equal zero to derive the first-order condition 
Conclusion
This paper develops an R&D-based growth model to analyze the effects of defense R&D on growth and welfare. We find that the growth effect of defense R&D follows an inverted-U shape reflecting the opposing forces of the crowding-out effect on civilian R&D versus the spillover and spin-off effects. Also, whether or not the reduction in defense R&D in the US should have improved economic growth (social welfare) depends on the level of defense R&D in the economy relative to its growth-maximizing (welfare-maximizing) level, which in turn is determined by the spillover and spin-off effects (the security-enhancing effect). We also find that the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D can be above or below the growth-maximizing level. These theoretical results imply that even if defense R&D contributes to growth as suggested by recent empirical evidence, reducing defense R&D can still be consistent with either a positive or negative effect on social welfare. This finding suggests the importance of investigating beyond the growth effects when policymakers perform a cost-benefit analysis on defense R&D. Finally, the canonical quality-ladder model is a first-generation R&D-based growth model that exhibits scale effects (i.e., a larger economy experiences a higher growth rate).
In this study, we set aside the issue of scale effects by normalizing the supply of skilled labor to unity.
12
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